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ANDREW CULHAM 
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MELANIE NIND 
The Open University 
This paper considers two major movements affecting the lives of people with 
an intellectual disability: normalisation and inclusion. The authors look back at 
the normalisation movement, reviewing its aims, processes and outcomes, and 
explore its relationship and compatibility with inclusion. In looking forward 
to the realisation of the inclusion agenda they ask whether normalisation 
is a suitable platform on which to build inclusion, or whether a process 
of deconstruction is needed. They discuss what lessons can be learnt from 
normalisation for the inclusion movement. 
Introduction 
The concept of normalisation has been a dominant force in social and educational policy 
for people with an intellectual disability for three decades. In the last decade, the concept 
of inclusion, and more particularly inclusive education, has started to come into 
ascendance. Both concepts, although not always sitting well together, have become 
important guiding principles in creating and implementing services for people with an 
intellectual disability and thinking about their education. 
Much research and debate has been generated from the principles of normalisation by 
academics and practitioners around the world. Scandinavia saw some of the earliest 
models of normalisation develop (Bank-Mikkelson, 1980; Grunewald, 1986; Nirje, 1970, 
1976) and in the USA the concept took a strong hold (Wolfensberger, 1972, 1980b). In 
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66 Culham & Nind 
Australia the influence of normalisation has "waxed and waned" with impetus gained 
from a visit from Nirje in 1985 and hesitation evident in institutional opposition (Rapley 
& Baldwin, 1995, p. 142). Nonetheless, influential visits by Wolfensburger combined with 
the growth of PASS (Program Analysis of Service Systems) and PASSING (Program 
Analysis of Service Systems Implementation of Normalization Goals) (Wolfensberger & 
Glenn, 1973a, 1973b) workshops has left a dedicated network of social role valorisation 
(SRV) advocates in Australia. In Great Britain and Europe the impact has been 
enormous and the debate is sometimes fierce (Brown & Smith, 1992; Tyne, 1989). 
Inclusion too is researched and debated across the globe. Impetus for this has been 
gained from nations signing the "Salamanca Agreement" (UNESCO, 1994) and com- 
mitting themselves to a philosophy in which inclusion and participation are recognised as 
essential to human dignity and the exercise of human rights; ordinary schools with an 
inclusive orientation are seen as the best means of combating discrimination and building 
an inclusive society. 
Inclusion has been variously conceptualised as a process of reconstruction and reform 
to increase access and participation (e.g., Mittler, 2000); a process of increasing partici- 
pation and decreasing exclusion from mainstream settings and communities (e.g., Booth 
& Ainscow, 1998); about respect, equality and collective belonging (e.g., Thomas & 
Loxley, 2001); and positive responses to diversity (e.g., Barton, 1997). Such concepts 
of inclusion tend to "transcend the concept of normalisation.. . by using language that 
emphasises participation over normalcy" (Florian, 1998, p. 16). Inclusion is increasingly 
seen as about race, gender, poverty and transcending traditional boundaries between 
those with and without a disability through a focus on the actions and responsibilities of 
everyone and not just on those of the disadvantaged, disabled or previously marginalised. 
The different voices in the inclusion movement place different emphases on the values, 
organisational, and pragmatic dimensions. Most dissent focuses on the operationalisa- 
tion of the concept and on what is realistically achievable and even desirable (e.g., 
Hornby, 1999; Low, 1997). There is debate on how far to go with inclusion and on how 
to get there, but much support for the notion of inclusion as a journey or process of 
continual societal adjustment. 
In the USA, Skrtic (1991), Stainback and Stainback (1992, 1996) and Villa and 
Thousand (1995) illustrate the struggle to break down the bipartite system of special and 
mainstream provision and to restructure and collaborate for greater heterogeneity. In 
Australia, Slee (1995, 1996) has documented the variable progress towards inclusion. 
Some countries, such as Italy, have seen more action (with the closure of most special 
schools) than research, and others more debate and research than action (Mittler, 2000). 
Ainscow (1999), Thomas (1997), Thomas, Walker & Webb (1998) have illustrated 
the concept in action in the UK, and Ainscow (1994) and O'Hanlon (1995) have 
disseminated developments towards inclusion in the Southern hemisphere and in Europe. 
Unlike normalisation, inclusion has also been on the agenda in the so-called developing 
countries (O'Toole & McConkey, 1995). 
Normalisation and inclusion have in common a suggestion of a "new dawn" in how 
services and education are provided and practice organised. Both claim to have the 
interests of people with disabilities at heart, yet they have very different value bases 
and aims that threaten their compatibility (Culham, 2000). Thomas and Loxley (2001) 
have recently made an extended case for the need to deconstruct special education before 
constructing a framework for inclusion and inclusive education. They illustrate the 
problems of overlaying policies for inclusion onto policies that are the legacy of earlier 
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Deconstructing normalisation 67 
thinking. They show how, in the UK for example, the lingering policies of the New Right 
undermine inclusion. In this paper we look back at the normalisation movement, 
reviewing its aims, processes and outcomes and ask, is normalisation a suitable basis 
on which to build inclusion? This is a discussion paper in which we present a range of 
arguments rather than an empirical study. 
Models of normalisation 
Normalisation has, over the past 30 years, been interpreted in a number of ways, 
providing numerous theories and definitions. As a consequence, according to Emerson 
(1992) there is " ... no such thing as the concept or principle of normalisation" (p. l), but 
rather a series of normalisations (Baldwin, 1985). Each definition is unique, yet 
importantly they share common traits with each other and in a sense not only illustrate 
the socio-geographical divide between each school of thought, but an ongoing academic 
debate that attempts to determine the meaning of normalisation and its connotations for 
service users and providers. The principles of normalisation have undergone various 
modifications and reconstruction during the 1970s and 1980s as they journeyed from 
Scandinavia to the USA and Australia and returned to Europe. 
The popularity of normalisation has been international, but the different models have 
been somewhat geographically defined. In Scandinavia, Bank-Mikkelson (1980), Head of 
the Danish Mental Retardation Service, was the first user of the term "normalisation", 
which he regarded as creating "an existence for the mentally retarded as close to normal 
living conditions as possible.. . making normal, mentally retarded people's housing, 
education, working and leisure conditions" (p. 56). Importantly, this also meant in this 
model, "bringing them [the mentally retarded] the legal and human rights of all other 
citizens" (p. 56). Nirje (Director of the Swedish Association for Retarded Children) 
(1970, 1976, 1985) elaborated the principles of normalisation in Denmark, pursuing 
a concern that the rhythm of a person's day should reflect that of an "average" person 
matched for sex, age and culture, maintaining personal behaviours and characteristics. 
While Nirje (1980) identified areas of life where normalisation could effectively change or 
"fine-tune" behaviours that society deemed "undesirable", he also wanted society to be 
more accepting of people with an intellectual disability, including their differences. 
Both the Nirje and Bank-Mikkelson models of normalisation supported the notion 
of integration for people with an intellectual disability, but this was secondary in 
importance to issues of equality and human rights. The Scandinavian formulation was 
unapologetic about its humanistic, egalitarian value base. In the USA, Wolfensberger 
(1980a) criticised both Nirje and Bank-Mikkelson as ineffective and regarded their 
models as overly concerned with equality and rights at a price that a "devalued" 
individual could not uphold. "Genuine" normalisation, integration and equality, accord- 
ing to Wolfensberger, would not succeed without social contact and the abandonment of 
segregation. Consequently, Wolfensberger (1 98Oa, 1983) proposed a revised interpreta- 
tion of the Scandinavian model of normalisation linked with the civil rights movement 
and based on socio-political ideals in the USA. Both the Scandinavian and American 
models of normalisation shared an eager challenge to institutional segregation. 
Wolfensberger's model expanded its focus from people with an intellectual disability 
and/or mental health difficulties, to apply to all devalued and deviant groups in society. 
It moved from an explicit ideological base to a form of "scientific theory" allied to social 
and behavioural science (Wolfensberger, 1985, p. 5). Normalisation for Wolfensberger 
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68 Culham & Nind 
(1972, p. 8) involved "conditions at least as good as that of the average citizen" in order 
to "as much as possible enhance or support their behaviour, appearances, experiences, 
status and reputation". According to this model, people who do not integrate, and 
therefore remain "different", may find it difficult to become valued by others. Society 
may surmise those who are regarded as "different", with what Wolfensberger (1980b) 
terms "negatively valued differentness" or "social devaluation". Furthermore, that 
society is likely to perpetuate these devaluing and stereotypical labels and attitudes. The 
American model, although not indifferent to ideas of human rights, drew more on 
deviancy theory. 
There was a period in which normalisation philosophy became so entrenched in 
everyday thinking and practice in the intellectual disability field that it was as if no one 
dared question it. Wolfensberger's brand of thinking, however, has ultimately come 
under a great deal of criticism, mostly from academics, but also from practitioners 
working with people with (intellectual) disabilities. Despite the far-reaching adoption of 
practices based on normalisation principles and the widespread recognition of the many 
benefits of these for service users, normalisation has become tainted with controversy. 
Much of the criticism has stemmed from the emergence and growth of the social model 
of disability, in which the medical model where people are cast as individually lacking 
has been challenged, and instead society has been seen as disabling (Oliver, 1993). This 
has similarly led to challenges of the concern within normalisation to change and 
"normalise" an individual's difference, requiring them to conform in order to gain 
acceptance. 
Perrin and Nirje (1985) were sensitive to this criticism and sought to disassociate their 
model from it: 
Probably the most common misinterpretation of the normalisation principle 
is the mistaken belief that it means mentally handicapped people must be 
expected to, indeed be forced to, act 'normal', to conform in all respects to 
society's statistical norms for all dimensions of behaviour . . . normalisation 
does not mean normalcy; it does not mean that people should be norma- 
lised . . . normalisation means the acceptance of a person with their handicap 
within 'normal society' (pp. 69-70). 
The requirement to conform was a charge that Wolfensberger also ardently rebuked. In 
an attempt to allay confusion and controversy, he abandoned the term normalisation 
and adopted instead the term "social role valorisation" (SRV) (Wolfensberger, 1983). 
This, he argued, was intended to separate the controversial moral interpretations of 
normalisation, and to clarify its true intentions, which were about using culturally valued 
means in "the creation, support, and defence of valued social roles for people who are at 
risk of social devaluation" (p. 234). 
Achievements of normalisationl SRV 
The movement for normalisation or SRV has, according to its supporters, achieved 
much over the last four decades. Such supporters would argue that it has survived as an 
educational and social tool for so long because it has led to the successful integration of 
devalued individuals. Achievements claimed for normalisation and SRV are improved 
lives for those who have been "devalued" and discriminated against (O'Brien & Lyle, 
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Deconstructing normalisation 69 
1989; O'Brien & Tyne, 1981) and the creation of services aimed at maintaining such 
standards of improvement (Campaign for People with Mental Handicaps, 1981). 
The success of normalisation1SRV can be measured against its aims, but these 
are variable according to the various models. Indeed, some of the conceptual confusion 
(Baldwin, 1985; Rapley & Baldwin, 1995) has interfered with the evaluation of impact. 
Even Wolfensberger (1980a) has acknowledged that some aspects of normalisation 
are too complex to be fully researchable. A breadth of impact is widely claimed, with 
benefits in the arenas of employment, education, training, social interaction and 
independent living. 
In more tangible terms, the accomplishments credited to the operationalisation of 
normalisation (Nirje, 1980; Wolfensberger, 1980b) can be listed as follows. First, the 
teaching of skills and competencies to those who may need them to grow and develop- 
in essence to minimise their own disability. Second, the gaining of respect, status and 
dignity for people with disabilities through the acquisition of new competencies and 
behaviour and the adoption of socially valued roles. Third, normalisationISRV has 
created a presence for people with disabilities who, with their new-found competencies, 
are able to share space with the rest of "normal" society. Fourth, as a result of this 
physical presence they have been able to secure and develop relationships within their 
communities. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, normalisationISRV has, through its 
other achievements, given people with disabilities the freedom of choice and opportunity, 
to gain employment, independence and social autonomy. 
The achievements of normalisation1SRV perhaps can be primarily seen in terms 
of improved services for people with disabilities (Tyne, 1992). The UK, for example, 
witnessed a number of scandals and subsequent inquiries regarding the "care" of people 
with disabilities in long-stay hospitals, institutions and care homes, and in the search for 
a service philosophy that would guide services and service providers towards a better 
model, normalisation principles were influential. Particular impact was made by the 
writings of O'Brien (1985; O'Brien & Tyne, 1981) with much re-shaping of old models 
of service. 
The degree of improvement in services that can be accounted for by normalisationl 
SRV may be debated. Indeed it may be misleading to see improvement as constant, 
because threats from competitive employment, for example, slow down aspects of 
progress. Nonetheless, the normalisation principles and goals have undoubtedly made 
considerable impact as a framework for evaluation (O'Brien & Lyle, 1989). They have 
"led to an examination of how services can support or hinder people with significant 
handicaps or disabilities in having more valued social roles and a better quality of life" 
(Carson, 1992, p.216). Many authorities have adopted the evaluation tools and 
materials, such as PASS and PASSING (Wolfensberger & Glenn, 1973a, 1973b, 1975; 
Wolfensberger & Thomas, 1983), to determine how and to what extent services for 
people with disabilities use the principles of normalisation. Normalisation-inspired 
activity has included de-institutionalisation, to be replaced by ever smaller group homes 
in ordinary houses in ordinary streets and the use of ordinary education, health and 
leisure facilities (King's Fund Centre, 1980). With a huge influence on service provision 
"the goals of normalisation have become synonymous with the goals of community care" 
(Chappell, 1992, p. 35) (leading to further conceptual confusion). 
The normalisation movement has also left a legacy in terms of widespread influence. A 
number of organisations and bodies have adopted its tenets, including, in the UK, the 
Campaign for People with Mental Handicaps, the Community and Mental Handicap 
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70 Culhain & Nind 
Education and Research Association, the King's Fund Centre and the Independent 
Development Council for People with Mental Handicaps (Emerson, 1992, p. 13). 
Research has been influenced by normalisation ideology (together with feminist and 
other new paradigm research and the social model of disability), such that researchers 
have moved towards a more participatory stance and people with an intellectual dis- 
ability have taken on valued social roles in inclusive research projects (Walmsley, 2001). 
In research, as in other activities, normalisation has led to contact between people 
without a disability and people with an intellectual disability, the former often acting 
as advocate and paving the way for self-advocacy. Who should set the research agenda 
and who should decide on the ideal against which services are often evaluated in joint 
research projects, however, is uncomfortable territory between normalisation and 
disability politics (see Walmsley, 2001). 
Legacies of normalisationlSRV: criticisms of practice 
Criticism of norrnalisation1SRV has focused on the underlying philosophy and set of 
principles, on the methods and the actions related to these, and on the way in which 
the ideas have been transmitted and taught (Baldwin, 1985). We turn now to 
consideration of the legacies of normalisationISRV, going beyond the achievements 
outlined above to the basis it provides, good and bad, for building inclusive education 
and practice. 
It is difficult to deny that for many people with an intellectual disability there has been 
a tremendous shift towards a more "normal" way of life. The life story work of people 
with an intellectual disability, supported by Atkinson and colleagues (Atkinson et al., 
2000; Brigham, Atkinson, Jackson, Rolph & Walmsley, 2000) illustrates all too clearly 
the joy experienced by people with an intellectual disability at seeing the doors of long- 
stay hospitals finally close and new doors open for them. It is not our intention 
to underestimate the importance of changes towards ordinary living for those involved, 
but rather to note the half-heartedness of these trends. While lifestyles that are very 
obviously not ordinary are now often seen as unacceptable, the new lifestyles that are 
available are often prescribed rather than chosen and come within narrow parameters. 
Heavy conditions and even penalties have often accompanied access to ordinary 
environments. Penalties might include loss of freedom to "roam" that some people with 
an intellectual disability enjoyed in the institutions, together with loss of friendships. 
Going to the park might be conditional upon keeping one's favoured "twiddle" in a 
pocket and not going on the swings or behaving in a child-like manner. 
The real legacy of the normalisation movement can be seen to be a status quo that has 
been largely unchallenged. The power dynamics in which professionals hold on to key 
decision-making is unthreatened (Aspis, 1997; Chappell, 1992). Schools, colleges and 
workplaces have been required to do little to respond to the needs and rights of people 
with an intellectual disability and nothing major in terms of their systems and structures. 
People with an intellectual disability are present in services for ordinary people, due 
mostly to their own attempts (or attempts by others "on their behalf') to conform and 
be invisible (Rapley, Kiernan & Antaki, 1998). Attitudes may have changed because of 
the community presence of people with an intellectual disability, but the attitudes that 
are the legacy of normalisation are problematic in many ways. 
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Deconstructing normalisation 7 1 
Legacies of normalisationlSRV: values and attitudes 
The values and attitudes that can be regarded as a legacy of normalisation1SRV and 
analysed here as a foundation for inclusion are: attitudes towards difference, attitudes 
regarding normality, attitudes about who is responsible for the social acceptance of 
people with an intellectual disability and attitudes about their rights. 
Many of the concerns expressed about normalisation1SRV have focused on the denial 
of difference (Jenkinson, 1997; Peters, 1995). Despite the protests that Nirje would 
undoubtedly make at this position, the normalisation1SRV era has left practitioners 
thinking that difference is not something to be valued, while conformity is (Brown & 
Smith, 1992). Above all, visible markers of difference have come to have very negative 
associations. The movement has after all stressed the image of people with an intellectual 
disability as the route to their achieving dignity in a stance of "never mind the product, 
look at the packaging" (Coupe O'Kane, Porter & Taylor, 1994, p. 16). 
As an extension of this, assimilation has been seen as the way forward in eradicating 
visible difference (Allan, 1999). This assimilationist aspect of normalisation1SRV is 
at odds with the type of empowerment strategy used by other devalued groups (ethnic 
minorities, women, people with disabilities, gay) who have instead glorified their 
differences and openly congregated. This has served to separate people with an 
intellectual disability further, and left a feeling that their road to empowerment is a 
unique one. While other groups have come to regard themselves as strong, and been seen 
by others as such, the assimilation of normalisation1SRV has led only to a begrudging 
acceptance for people with an intellectual disability. It is this group who are still 
unashamedly expected to attempt to "pass" for "normal" (Shaddock & Zilber, 1991; 
Williams & Nind, 1999). 
Although not necessarily intended, normalisation has also left a legacy of attitudes 
towards normality, with "normal" thought of from a moral standpoint and equated with 
good rather than bad. Practitioners have given wide acceptance to the idea that there is 
an ordinary lifestyle, which is to be aspired to for their students or service users if not for 
themselves. This assumption, that to be normal is the aspiration of people with an 
intellectual disability and not just of their staff on their behalf, is recognised and strongly 
challenged by Morris (1991): "one of the most offensive features of prejudice which 
disabled people experience is the assumption that we want to be other than we are; that 
is, we want to be normal" (p. 34). 
Normality has become antithetical to diversity and seen as something that can and 
should be prescribed. It has become acceptable to change the behaviour, appearance and 
even preferences of people with an intellectual disability in the name of achieving their 
integration and valued role. Although normalisation1SRV should not be equated with 
the various means used to achieve such changes, it holds some responsibility for the 
attitude that even "radical measures" (Brown & Smith, 1992) are acceptable in an "ends 
justify the means" mentality. It is often maintained that people with an intellectual 
disability have to survive and compete in an unfair world and so a mindset has prevailed 
in which the requirement to behave normally is made of those "on trial" by those with 
authority (Corbett, 1991). Only a minority of critics have challenged this attitude by 
recognising that it is not the behaviour per se but who does it that leads to rejection, and 
so changing it is unlikely to be a viable route to being seen as normal (Murdoch, 1997) 
or as an "insider" (Williams & Nind, 1999). 
Corbett's (1991) point about who is on trial and who has authority is an important 
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72 Culham & Nind 
one in terms of the legacy of attitudes from normalisation1SRV. The philosophy and 
practice have made a strong impact on ideas about who is responsible for the social 
acceptance of people with an intellectual disability. Staff frequently take responsibility 
for working for this social acceptance as a key function of their job, with as strong a 
sense of duty to the public audience as to their clients/students (Nind & Hewett, 1996). 
This is understood in terms of the outcomes being better, both for "this person" and for 
all persons with an intellectual disability in the long run. The public audience is not 
expected to take responsibility for their attitudes and is forgiven their discrimination, 
while there is a blame culture in which people with an intellectual disability are held 
responsible for their own social devaluation (Baldwin, 1985). This endorses attitudes 
about their need for professionals to help them (Chappell, 1992) with visible solutions 
and an approach to gaining dignity that is different from how others gain it (Thomas & 
Loxley, 2001). 
The legacy of attitudes undoubtedly goes on and on, but the last to be considered here 
is the attitude towards people's rights. There may have been an egalitarian, human rights 
steer underpinning normalisation, but thinking has inevitably evolved and distorted it. 
The right to ordinary living and to participation is valued strongly by practitioners in 
the field, but Shaddock and Zilber (1991) illuminate where attitudes about this from 
normalisation1SRV are problematic: 
Is living in a normalized environment only justified if it leads to normalized 
behaviour? Is a normalized environment only a means to an end? We would 
suggest that access to a normalized environment is a basic right for all 
people-the starting point, rather than the destination (p. 173). 
The need for deconstruction 
Critics have questioned the longevity of normalisation1SRV. Mesibov (1976), for 
instance, looking forward saw the normalisation principle "as an excellent starting point 
for developing community-based services7', but noted, "this does not mean that the 
principle should be automatically pursued forever" (p. 30). Similarly, Shaddock and 
Zilber (1991) looking back some years later, commented: 
Normalization and Social Role Valorization, while necessary in their time, 
have now taken us as far as they can go ... do we really need a separate 
guiding philosophy for people with disabilities or is all we need an 
acknowledgement that they too have basic human and citizenship rights like 
everybody else? (p. 174). 
This leads to the question considered here: is now the time to celebrate what has been 
achieved, to learn lessons from the critics and the mistakes, and to embrace a new 
guiding philosophy that is not exclusive to people with an intellectual disability? 
The question misleadingly, of course, implies that guiding philosophies take turns in a 
simple linear fashion, each giving way to the other, politely not interfering! This is clearly 
not the case and inclusion and normalisation have co-existed in recent years. Culham 
(2000) has suggested that they are not altogether "compatible" and Thomas and Loxley 
(2001), addressing a similar discomfort between special education and inclusion, have 
argued for deconstructing one regime before constructing another. They doubt the 
feasibility of anything like a smooth transition from special education to inclusion, 
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Deconstructing normalisation 73 
interrogating the epistemological basis of the concepts and addressing problems of 
"incremental dissonance" in which there are new policies layered "on top of policies that 
have demonstrably contrary effects" (p. 96). 
This same argumentltreatment can be applied to normalisation and inclusion. Does 
normalisationISRV provide the right foundations for inclusion or is there a need for 
deconstruction here too? Thomas and Loxley (2001) contend that it is important to 
challenge these big theories as, although they are useful as "thinking tools", they can 
dominate and dictate and become "hypnotic and even dangerous". They note, "things 
become shaped according to the theoretical lens through which one is viewing them" 
(p. 9). Deconstructing normalisationISRV is not about pulling down small group homes 
and re-building institutions, but about changing the way we view things. In looking at 
the impact on values and attitudes that normalisation1SRV has made, this paper has 
begun to illuminate what may need to be deconstructed and what challenges may need to 
be made to past orthodoxy. 
The danger in thinking about inclusion, like the danger in thinking about normalisa- 
tion, is thinking of it as a single concept, in which everyone agrees about all aspects. Just 
as there are different normalisations (Baldwin, 1985) there are different inclusions (Low, 
1997). However, there is some consensus that inclusion is about gender, ethnicity, 
poverty, sexuality and not just about disability. It encompasses the process of increasing 
the participation of those with disabilities in mainstream community and schooling, 
through a process of reform and restructuring of systems and schools, so that they take 
responsibility. Thus, it is linked with the social model of disability rather than with a 
deficit model. At the heart of inclusion is the right to not be excluded and for individuals, 
whatever their difference, to be treated with respect and given opportunities. 
The way in which difference is viewed in inclusion is incompatible with the way in 
which it is viewed in normalisation. The former is more celebratory and the latter more 
apologetic. For inclusion, difference is ordinary (Ballard, 1995) (although in Nirje's 
writing there is an acceptance of this too). Ainscow (1999) writes of the need for a 
"transformative" rather than a "normative" lens to view difference. In this way, it is not 
evaluated as good or bad, but seen as an aid to improving education and other services. 
If the system can be made to address the needs of children experiencing difficulties with 
literacy, the rights of the young people whose behaviour makes challenges and so on, 
then they help to transform it into a better system for everyone. 
Who is held responsible for the participation of people with an intellectual disability is 
also an arena of incompatibility between normalisation1SRV and inclusion. Mason and 
Reiser (1990) have challenged the notion, inherent in normalisation thinking, that people 
with an intellectual disability need to "adapt to a hostile environment", and challenged 
the practices in which "people have become individual objects to be 'treated', 'changed', 
'improved' and made more 'normal"' (p. 14). In Wolfensberger's SRV model (as opposed 
to Nirje's model), practitioners are charged with helping people with an intellectual 
disability do ordinary things, in order for them to gain social value, which has to be 
earned through "being like us". 
Inclusion is more aligned to the kind of reverse normalisation that Henderson (1996) 
described, in which those with authority and privilege rid themselves of their 
"inappropriate behaviours" of exclusion, rejection, hostility, ridicule and paternalism. 
For many inclusionists, what distinguishes inclusion from integration is the acceptance 
that the school/system has to adapt to the participants and not the person with 
disabilities or other difference who has to adapt in order to gain entry (Mittler, 2000). 
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74 Culham & Nind 
Integration has put the onus of readiness on the individual rather than the institution. 
Institutional adjustments have often been piecemeal or add-on rather than the funda- 
mental and pervasive change called for in inclusion. The mere presence or co-location 
of previously marginalised groups, with adjustments as necessary, is not enough for 
inclusionists; the quality of participation and the removal of barriers to such 
participation is the focus of much inclusion work. 
Ferri and Gregg (1998) comment that in normalisation "individuals are encouraged to 
change themselves to gain access to society, rather than calling into question their 
exclusion in the first place" (p. 435). In contrast, the starting point for inclusion is 
that inclusion is not conditional but a right-with accompanying remedy-or at least 
an entitlement within the sphere of basic human rights. This places the onus of 
responsibility on all of  us not to allow such a fundamental human right to be trans- 
gressed. Inclusion places people with an intellectual disability in a much more powerful 
position of claiming their rights, which in normalisationISRV are given and thus can be 
taken away (Brown & Smith, 1989). One might, of course, argue that a requirement to be 
included is no less impositional than a requirement to be integrated or normalised; the 
operationalisation of the inclusion concept would need to avoid such imposition. 
The tension yet to be resolved by inclusionists is what to do about those who want to 
exercise a right to be outside of mainstream provision. There is still an assumption in 
inclusion like the strong inference in normalisation1SRV (Chappell, 1994) that a 
community of people who share a learning disability is inferior to a mixed community in 
which people with an intellectual disability can be among peers who are more able. The 
UK government is attempting to provide inclusive education alongside a system in which 
special and selective schools still have a place (Riddell, 2000). Critics such as Booth 
(2000) would argue that this financially and philosophically undermines inclusion. One 
might say that inclusion brings a stronger right to be different and still centrally placed 
and participating, but is less sure of the right to be different and opt not to participate 
in mainstream schooling or other community activity. Williams and Nind (1999) have 
argued that women with an intellectual disability might have more to gain from coalition 
with other outsiders than from clamouring to be "insiders". Ultimately, as the cultural 
norm itself is broadened and questioned, inclusion should eradicate the need to seek 
strength in such coalitions, but discomfort is inevitable during the process of change. 
It might be argued that normalisation and inclusion are guiding philosophies that have 
the same end in common, but that have different ideas about the means of reaching that 
end. There is indeed a shared desire to see people with an intellectual disability as valued 
members of the community. There is a key difference, however, in that in normalisation 
or SRV, at least, this community presence and value are earned through denial of 
difference, whereas in inclusion the person's difference is welcome and valued. This 
distinction is important to the consideration of whether inclusion can grow out of 
normalisationISRV, based on the roots laid down by one model/movement for the other. 
Inclusion seems to emerge more strongly from criticisms of normalisation1SRV than 
from the movement itself. 
The "deliberate mistake" in the argument in this paper is that the worst of 
normalisationISRV has been considered alongside the best of inclusion. One could argue 
that "good" normalisation and "bad" inclusion have more in common! Baldwin (1985) 
reminds us that many of the critiques of normalisation have failed to explicitly identify 
which model is being criticised. There are certainly fewer differences between Nirje's 
model and inclusion than between Wolfensberger's SRV and inclusion. Nonetheless, the 
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Deconstructing normalisation 75 
legacy of SRV may be stronger, and the need to deconstruct much of the "way of seeing" 
associated with it is evident. 
Conclusion: learning from normalisation1SRV 
It is appropriate and timely for this discussion to culminate in a consideration of the 
lessons that can be learned from normalisation1SRV. Can the inclusion movement avoid 
making the same mistakes? With normalisation1SRV one can look back and see how 
things have become distorted and that some of what has happened in its name is not true 
to early conceptualisations of what is important to the philosophy. It is too early to do 
this with inclusion, although the conceptual confusions with integration already show 
signs of leading to confusion in practice and practitioner thinking. 
Rapley and Baldwin (1995) argue that a "lack of conceptual clarity amongst policy 
makers was viewed as one possible obstacle to successful normalisation implementation" 
(p. 143). There is clearly enormous potential for this with inclusion. Baldwin (1985) notes 
how criticisms of normalisation have confused means with goals and equated normalisa- 
tion with mainstreaming. This lack of clarity is already happening again with inclusion 
where many of the pragmatic criticisms are about integration. Comments that inclusion 
will not work are based on mainstream schools and communities as they currently are 
and not on how they need to change in their radical overhaul to become inclusive. 
Shaddock and Zilber (1991) argue that "normalization is one of those illusory 
concepts that everyone understands until asked to give examples of how it might affect 
practice" (p. 170). There was and is a philosophy-practice gap in normalisation that 
could easily be repeated in inclusion. Again, there is a danger of over-simplification 
here as policies become lived, more than just text, as they are interpreted and enacted 
by practitioners. Practitioners of norrnalisationlSRV could enact any of a number of 
normalisations and practitioners of inclusion can enact any of a number of inclusions. 
They can indeed create their own. 
Nind (2000) compared teachers' understanding of interactive approaches in special 
education with the critical concepts that underpinned their development and found some 
elements enhanced and some undermined, almost forgotten. The same can be said of 
normalisation1SRV where rights of people with an intellectual disability to ordinary 
experiences became subservient to a duty to lead ordinary lives defined by more powerful 
others (Chappell, 1992; Williams & Nind, 1999). Wolfensberger distanced SRV from 
the egalitarian, human rights value base of Nirje's normalisation to make it "scientific". 
In inclusion, debates already rage about its empirical basis. Questions are asked, for 
example, about the evidence for inclusive education leading to better outcomes than 
special education (Hornby, 1999). The need for such evidence is rejected by those 
who argue that inclusion is a human rights issue (Mittler, 2000; Thomas, 1997). With 
inclusion, as with normalisation, is the human rights agenda in danger of being lost all 
over again? Or, through critical appraisal and learning lessons from the past, are we 
wiser now? 
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